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Rhetorical Styles on the
Fuller Court
by

WALTER

F.

PRATT*

"Formalism" is the label regularly used to describe judicial
opinions of the late nineteenth century. 1 The label is descriptive
when used in contradistinction to "instrumentalism." Use of the
label, however, has certain drawbacks. For example, there is little
objective or empirical evidence to support the application of the two
antithetical terms. In addition, a single term cannot reflect whatever
diversity of styles may exist among the judges of a single court. This
article describes the results of an attempt to rectify those two drawbacks and to determine whether the Justices of the Supreme Court at
the turn of the century-while Melville Fuller was Chief Justicewere as monochromatic as the single term "formalism" would
suggest. The article relies upon objective measurements to demonstrate that there was a variety, one might say a richness, of styles
among the Justices of the Fuller Court.
The article is based upon a study of a sample of cases from
eleven terms, from 1895 through 1905, of the Fuller Court. The
sample was made up of the cases involving a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, including state, federal, and territorial. In
all there were 286 cases. 2 The terms were selected because they
were the terms during which Justices Brown and Peckham sat together. Those Justices were of interest because.preliminary research
had suggested that their styles might represent the extremes on the
Court. They were also the terms with the most continuity among the

* Assistant Professor, School of Law, Duke University

1. The seminal work espousing that characterizaion is, of course, K. Llewellyn.
The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960). More recent studies include:
e.g., M. Horwitz, The Transformation ofAmerican Law, 1780-1860 (1977); Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976);
Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning
in Nineteenth Century America, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 513 (1974). Contra J. Semonche,
Charting the Future 426-27 (1978).
2. Those cases represent almost thirteen percent of the cases decided by the Court
during the eleven terms. See W. King, Melville Weston Fuller 339 (1950).
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Justices; only four Justices were appointed during the period.3 Cases involving a challenge to a statute were selected because
"formalism" takes one of its attributes from such cases. That is, the4
formalistic style is associated with an anti-legislative bent.
Moreover, these cases seemed most likely to produce explanations
of judicial philosophy because they involved the Court in a potential
conflict with other branches and levels of government.
Analysis of the decisions alone would not have satisfactorily
rectified the shortcomings associated with the formalisminstrumentalism dichotomy. There would still be a need for some
empirical support for the analysis. Voting patterns could provide
some such support, but they reveal little about the content of a
Justice's style. Other than the voting patterns, quantifiable information about a Justice can come only from the length of his opinions or
from the precedents that he uses. Neither source of information
alone is particularly useful, largely because a Justice who writes long
opinions would be expected to cite more cases.5 So, to provide
additional empirical support, this article relies upon the average
number of cases cited per page of opinion. All citations of authority
were counted, including cases from federal, state, and foreign

3. As it happens selection of the eleven dates has another, independent merit. They
are the terms during which the Fourteenth Amendment had its first heavy use. See E.
Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court 77 (1934). Moreover, this period marks
the decade immediately after the height of what Arnold Paul has described as the
"conservative crisis." See A. Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: Attitudes of Bar and Bench, 1887-1895 (1960).
4. At least in the late nineteenth century, formalism tended to be anti-legislative.
E.g., G. Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 63 (1977): M. Horwitz, supra note 1,
at 259.
5. The average length of each Justice's opinions is shown in the following chart:
Gray
Harlan
White
Peckham
[Court]
Brewer
Day
Brown
Fuller
McKenna
Holmes

12.24
12.16
10.20
9.94
[8.93]
8.75
8.15
7.43
6.84
5.99
3.54

That Holmes wrote the shortest opinions and Gray the longest is of interest. But it is
not a statistic that lends itself to speculation about the Justice's beliefs. Instead, it
says more about his literary style. The use of rate of citation of cases has the additional advantage of relating to the distinction between formalism and instrumentalism. The formalistic style is associated with frequent citation of precedent, with
the string citation.
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courts, as well as treatises or other scholarly works. 6 To provide a
single standard for comparison of the opinions written by the eleven
Justices, the number of cases cited in each opinion was divided by
the number of pages in the opinion. The result, the number of cases
per page, provided a statistic which allowed for the variation in the
length of opinions. The following table summarizes the results for all
opinions written by each Justice.

JUSTICE
Holmes
Day
Gray
Brown
Brewer
McKenna
[Court Average]
Fuller
Shiras
Harlan
White
Peckham

AVERAGE CASES PER PAGE
ALL
FEDERAL
STATE
3.35
2.16
1.06
3.19
2.19
0.997
2.79
1.65
1.02
2.59
1.72
0.80
2.32
1.84
0.48
2.23
1.31
0.91
[1.91]
[1.40]
[0.49]
1.88
1.42
0.45
1.72
1.37
0.35
1.42
1.07
0.33
1.41
1.16
0.24
1.34
1.08
0.26

Use of the average permits the Justices to be placed along a
continuum that is defined by Justice Holmes on one end, with an
average of 3.3 cases per page, and Justice Peckham on the other end,
with an average of 1.3. The numbers themselves, of course, prove
nothing. But they do serve to support what would otherwise be no
more than an impression of different concepts of the judicial craft.
The various patterns illustrate differences in the Justices' style of
argument, if not of reasoning. Judicial rhetoric is probably the best
term for what is being described, for it encompasses all that is involved in the process of argumentation and debate.

6. The average was determined by counting the number and type of citation used in
each of the sample cases. The number of cases cited was determined by counting each
time a case was mentioned in the opinion. Whenever the same case was cited more
than once, each citation was counted (that is, three references to A v. B were counted
as three cases). The number of pages was also counted, compensating for the longer
pages in volumes 160-190 (38 lines per page) by computing their length at the rate of 36
lines per page as in volumes 191-202. The number of lines was counted from the
notation "Mr. Justice
delivered the opinion of the court" to the end of the
opinion (including the order of the Court). The statement of facts was not counted
unless it formed part of the opinion. The number of cases was then divided by the
number of pages to obtain the average number of cases cited per page.
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Justices, like all judges, write opinions to explain results and to
persuade readers of the correctness of the results. A particular style
of reasoning, such as formalism, does not dictate a particular result.
Instead, the explanations of a particular result are based upon the
writer's judgment that certain arguments will be persuasive for the
particular facts. The judgment is based upon both what a Justice
thinks is important and what a Justice thinks is likely to persuade
those who read the opinion. For the Fuller Court two characteristics
can be used to describe the rhetorical styles of the various Justices:
the frequency of citing precedents and the degree of deference
shown to legislative action.
Taken together, the two factors reveal much about how each
Justice perceived his role and that of the Court. Moreover, the comparison also leads to an understanding of what each Justice considered to be most important in determining the outcome of particular
cases. On the Fuller Court there was a diversity of perceptions and
of primary values. That is not to suggest that the diversity in rhetorical style produced a diversity in result. The Fuller Court was, by
today's standards, remarkably homogeneous in its results. Three of
every five decisions were unanimous. Even so, that homogeneity
conceals a Court whose members were quite different, just as does
the single term "formalism."
The Justices on the Fuller Court fall into three groups. The
groups can be defined by the two characteristics, one, the use of
precedent, the other, the deference to legislative actions. Interestingly, the Justices may be placed along the continuum defined by the
use of precedent in roughly the same order as for the degree of
deference. Thus, one group, composed of Justices Holmes, Day,
Gray, and Brown, showed the most deference toward legislatures
and supported their decisions with the most frequent citation of
cases. The other group, Justices Shiras, Harlan, White, and Peckham, were least deferential to legislatures and least inclined to rely
upon precedent. Overlapping those two groups were the remaining
Justices, Brewer, McKenna, and Fuller.7
Of the eleven Justices, Justice Holmes had the highest rate of
citing cases. Joining the Court in 1902, he sat for only the last four of
the eleven terms covered by this article. Nevertheless, his twentysix opinions are sufficient to provide insight into his rhetorical style.8
Holmes explained the philosophy underlying that voting pattern in

7. Measurement of the inclination to overturn statutes is based upon both textual
analysis and voting patterns. The following chart shows the percentage of votes cast

by each Justice to overturn a statute. The percentage was obtained by counting the
total number of votes cast to overturn, regardless of whether the vote was in majority
or in dissent, or whether the Justice casting the vote wrote an opinion. The total
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the first opinion be wrote for the Court. The case, Otis v. Parker, 9
arose under a provision of the California constitution that declared
void all contracts for the sale of corporate stock on margin or for
future delivery. Holmes acknowledged that a state could not arbitrarily interfere with private business, but, since "general prop-

ositions do not carry us far," "'judges were required to investigate
every case. In doing so, they were not to invalidate every law that to

them seemed "excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or based
upon conceptions of morality with which they disagree." " Instead,
because judges were not omniscient, they should show "great respect" for legislative enactments, which represented the "deepseated conviction on the part of the people concerned" as to what
was required by their situation.' 2 Any other course would alter the

nature of the Constitution from a document "embodying only relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all

English-speaking communities" to one that was "the partisan of a
particular set of ethical or economical opinions, which by no means
are held semper ubique et ab omnibus." 13

number of cases participated in was also counted. The percentage in the chart was
obtained by dividing the number of voLes cast by the number of possible votes.
Gray
Holmes
Day
Shiras
Fuller
[Court]
Brown
Brewer
McKenna
Peckham
White
Harlan

9.2
13.6
15.8
17.2
17.5
[20.5]
20.8
20.99
21.1
23.1
26.3
26.5

Comparison with the chart showing the average citation rate per page shows that the
grouping of Gray, Holmes, and Day remains consistent, as does the grouping of
Peckham, White, and Harlan. Justice Brown and Justice Shiras do not fall within the
two extreme groups when this measure is used. Textual analysis and shifts in use of
precedent place Brown with Holmes, Day, and Gray. Brown's voting pattern does
not squarely place him within that group. The same is true for Shiras. The text of the
article offers an explanation for the variations. As with the other measure, Justices
Fuller, Brewer, and McKenna are near the average for the entire Court.
8. All of his opinions were written to explain a vote to uphold a state statute. He
wrote neither to overturn a statute nor to explain a federal statute.
9. 187 U.S. 606 (1903).
10. Id. at 608.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 609.
13. Id.
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Holmes consistently exhorted the other Justices that they must
permit the legislatures great latitude. Just how much latitude Holmes
was willing to grant was revealed in Missouri, Kansas & Texas
Railway Company v. May. 14 In 1901 the Texas legislature had
passed a statute imposing a penalty on any railroad that permitted
either Johnson grass or Russian thistle to go to seed on its right of
way. The statute applied to no landowners or corporations other
than railroads. As in Otis v. Parker, Holmes observed that the dispute was not about the definition of a principle but about the
application-"whether this case lies on one side or the other of a
line which has to be worked out between cases differing only in
degree." 15 In deciding on which side of the line a statute fell, the
courts should defer to the legislature which was the "only judge of
the policy of a proposed discrimination." 16 The justification for
Holmes' judicial policy lay in the need for flexibility: "Great constitutional provisions must be administered with caution. Some play
must be allowed for the joints of the machine, and it must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and
welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." l"
Elsewhere Holmes repeated his admonition. "It is dangerous," he
wrote, "to tie down legislatures too closely by judicial constructions
not necessarily arising from the words of the Constitution." 8
All of those thoughts were incorporated into his terse dissent in
Lochner v. New York.' 9 Fittingly, this classic example of Holmes'
style was provoked by an opinion written by Justice Peckham,
whose style was at the opposite end of the spectrum from Holmes.
The dissent was an echo of his opinion in Otis (from which Peckham
had dissented without writing an opinion). Here again were characteristic themes-the accusation that the case was "decided upon an
economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain"; even if there was agreement, the Constitution did not embody
any particular economic theory; the admonition that personal views
were irrelevant in adjudging "the right of the majority to embody
their opinions in law"; and the reminder that "l[gleneral propositions
do not decide concrete cases." ' 0 None of Holmes' other opinions
14. 194 U.S. 267 (1904).
15. Id. at 269.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 270.
18. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430, 434 (1905).
19. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
20. Id. at 75-76. It may be that the stridency of Holmes' opinion was the result of
his perception of a new activism on the Court. Max Lerner has suggested that the
tone was in part the result of Holmes' having found his place on the Court and in part
the result of the clash of two intellectual universes, a divergence that is supported by
the contrast in judicial styles. See M. Lerner, The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes
147 (Modern Library ed. 1943).
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included such general statements of his philosophy. Nevertheless,
he regularly wrote epigrammatical opinions 21 which relied upon cita-

acceptance of an idea or the
tions of cases to demonstrate the
22
latitude that was granted a state.

Certain elements of Holmes' style were mirrored in the opinions
of Justice Day, whose rate of citation was second only to that of
Holmes. Day's position on the continuum is based upon only eight
opinions written for the Court after he joined the Court in 1903.
Those eight cases may not provide sufficient data for an accurate
portrayal of his style. Nevertheless, Day did reveal an approach

similar to Holmes' in Leigh v. Green. 23 Like Holmes, he minimized

the application of general principles. In upholding a state's power to

alter the procedures for foreclosing a tax lien, Day wrote that
whether due process had been denied depended upon the "nature of
each particular case." 24 In the same case Day alluded to the limited
courts in responding to challenges to a state's
role of the federal
25
taxing power.
That Day might not have allowed legislatures as wide latitude as
Holmes could be inferred from his long dissent in Security Mutual
Life Insurance Company v. Prewitt.26 Joined only by Justice Harlan,

Day argued that a state could not condition a license to sell insurance on the company's agreeing not to remove a case from state to
federal court. The dissent emphasized that there was a limit to a
state's power to impose restrictions on foreign corporations, and27
that a state could not compel the surrender of a constitutional right.
Any other rule, Day contended, would nullify the Constitution.

Justice Gray came next after Justices Holmes and Day in the
rate of citing cases. Holmes' predecessor on the Court, Gray, shared

with Holmes a predeliction for English cases. 2 ' Gray's interest in the

21. The average length of his opinions was 3.5 pages; for the entire Court the
average was 8.9 pages. See footnote 5 supra.
22. See, e.g., Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 U.S. 351, 358-60 (1904); Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204-06 (1904); Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U.S. 730, 732-33 (1903).
23. 193 U.S. 79 (1904).
24. Id. at 87. Holmes expressed similar statements in Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 U.S.
351, 358 (1904), and in Kidd v. Alabama, 188 W.S. 730, 733 (1903).
25. 193 U.S. at 89.
26. 202 U.S. 246 (1906). Interestingly, Peckham wrote the majority opinion in
Prewitt. In Lochner, Justice Day joined Justice Harlan's dissent.
27. 202 U.S. at 262, 266. Day also wrote one majority opinion that held a legislative
action was unconstitutional, Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904) (change in
area in which gas-works permitted).
28. Both Gray and Holmes cited an average of 0.11 English cases per page; the
Court's average was 0.02. Next after Gray and Holmes was Justice Brown, with an
average of 0.07. Justice Day, the other member of the quartet with the highest citation
rate, cited no English cases.
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antecedents of legal rules, however, appears to have been stronger
than that of Holmes. Whereas Holmes' primary tenet of interpretation was acquiescence to the preferences of the majority, Gray appears to 2 have
made historical pedigree the primary governing
9

criterion.

Gray's first opinion in the selected group was a model of his
style.3 0 The suit was one of many challenging a state's power to
assess and tax property of a foreign corporation. Gray began his
opinion by stating the principle that the Constitution limited the
states' power to tax foreign corporations. Then he commented that
each of the three challenges to the statute appeared "to be governed
by previous decisions of this court."3 There followed a discussion
of each of the three arguments and the relevant cases. Finally came
the conclusion that the decisions "clearly" established that the statute was valid.
Lowe v. Kansas presented a similar resort to precedent.3 2 Over
a dissent by Justice Brown, Gray upheld a statute that assessed the
costs of prosecution against a private prosecutor whenever the jury
found that the prosecution had been brought without probable cause
and for malicious motives. Lowe had argued that he was denied due
process because he had no opportunity to be heard on the issue of
his motivation. Gray responded that the libel action could not have
been tried without revealing Lowe's motives to the jury. Furthermore, the timing of trying the issue of motive was a "matter of
convenient practice, not of constitutional right." ' 33 Unlike Holmes
and Day, who said that due process depended upon the facts of the
case, Gray wrote:
Whether the mode of proceeding, prescribed by this statute, and followed in this case, was due process of law, depends
upon the question whether it was in substantial accord with the
law and usage in England before the Declaration of Independence, 3and
in this country since it became a nation, in similar
4
cases.

After referring to eleven cases, four statutes, and two abridgments,
Gray concluded that the challenged statute possessed the requisite
heritage.

29. For an example of the acuteness of Gray's focus on history see his dissenting
opinion in Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1,27 (1898).
30. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, 163 U.S. 1 (1896).
31. Id. at 15.
32. 163 U.S. 81 (1896).
33. Id. at 87.
34. Id. at 85.
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Although Gray did not always provide a recapitulation of the
history of a doctrine, his interest in history was the dominant characteristic of his opinions. Typically, he began a discussion of the
power of a state to impose absolute liability on a railroad for damage
caused by fire with these words:
The argument that this statute is in excess of the power of
the legislature may be most satisfactorily met by first tracing the
history of the law regarding the liability of persons for fire
originating on their own premises and spreading to the property
of others.

At common law . .

.35

After an exhaustive examination of the history, he concluded that a
state's police power permitted imposing liability on the user of a
dangerous instrumentality.
In addition to his respect fDr history, Gray, like the others with
high rates of citation, deferred to the choices of legislatures in adapting the law to changing circumstances.3 6 As with Justices Holmes
and Day, that deference was reflected in a high rate of citation for
state cases: Holmes (1.06), Gray (1.02), Day (0.997). The average for
the entire Court was 0.49 state cases per page.
With the next Justice, Justice Brown, each indicator of his style
supports similar conclusions. His rates of citation for all cases (2.6)
and for state cases (0.8) are above the average for the Court. Yet, in
an apparent anomaly, of the thirty-nine opinions he wrote, in fifteen
he argued that a statute should be overturned. In all, 20.8% of his
votes were cast to overturn a statute. That figure placed him at the
middle of the Court rather than with Holmes, Day, and Gray.
Nonetheless, when Justice Brown wrote for the Court to declare a
statute unconstitutional, his sense of value seemed to require greater
justification than when he wrote to uphold a statute. He increased
his rate of citation from 2.8 for- all majority opinions to 4.0 in those

35. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1, 5 (1897).
Compare the statement in text with this statement from Capital Traction Co. v.
Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1899):
The decision of this case mainly turns upon the scope and effect of the Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. It may therefore be convenient, before particularly examining the acts of Congress now in question, to
refer to the circumstances preceding and attending the adoption of this Amendment, to the contemporaneous understanding of its terms, and to the subsequent
judicial interpretation thereof, as aids in ascertaining its true meaning, and its
application to the case at bar.
See also Gulf. Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 166 (1897) (Gray, J.,
dissenting).
36. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1,44-45 (1899); Bauman v. Ross, 167
U.S. 548, 589 (1897).
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five majority opinions that struck down a statute. Although his rate
of citation and his concern for deferring to legislatures places him
with Holmes, Day, and Gray, his lesser trust in legislatures warrants
placing him at the boundary between the rest of the Court and those
Justices, and indicates the absence of sharp distinctions between the
groups.
Brown's opinions reflect a combination of the characteristics
that dominate the opinions of Holmes and Gray. Like Holmes,
Brown believed that every effort should be made to find a statute
valid and that flexibility was an important value. In one opinion
Brown advised his brethren that they should not seek "excuses for
holding acts of the legislative power to be void by reason of their
conflict with the Constitution, or with certain supposed fundamental
principles of civil liberty." Instead, "the effort should be to reconcile them [the statutes and the Constitution] if possible, and not to
hold the law invalid." 37 That admonition came in Brown v. Walker,
a case in which Brown wrote for a five-man Court to uphold the
power of Congress to compel testimony after granting immunity
from prosecution. In a phrase that anticipated Holmes, Brown wrote
that the Fifth Amendment "should be construed, as it was doubtless
designed, to effect a practical and beneficent purpose." 38 At the end
of his opinion, almost as an afterthought, he added that any interpretation that permitted a person to refuse to testify would mean that
there could be no prosecutions under the Interstate Commerce
39
Act.
The additional comment about the consequences of a particular
result was more than an afterthought, it was typical of Brown's
opinions. For instance, had the Court struck down Tennessee's law
that prohibited the importation of cigarettes into the state, the consequences would have been "far-reaching and disasterous." 4 o If a
state's railroad commission could not require a single through rate,
the commission "would be wholly inefficacious in a large number, if

37. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896).
38. Id. Brown was not averse to appealing to justice as was evident in his dissent in
Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81, 91 (1896).
39. For other appeals by Brown to the consequences of a decision see Camfield v.
United States, 167 U.S. 518, 527 (1897) (power of Congress to restrict fencing of
public land); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 280 (1897) (power of Congress to
empower justices of the peace to arrest seamen).
40. Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 360 (1900). When a similar case came to the
Court five years later, Brown wrote that the Court could not provide protection under
the commerce clause "without striking a serious blow at the rights of the States to
administer their own internal affairs." Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U.S. 261, 273
(1905). See also Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U.S. 17, 44 (1905) (dissenting
opinion).
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not a majority of cases-in fact . . . the whole purpose of the act

might be defeated." 41 In yet another case, Brown explained that
"II[t] o hold a sale invalid upon these allegations might result in upsetting every
sale for taxes made in West Virginia for the past twenty
42
years."
Brown deferred to the legislature to ensure that there was sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing conditions. That deference carried over into his rule for determining whether a classification was
reasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment. As he said in Plessy
v. Ferguson, "In determining the question of reasonableness it [the
state legislature] is at liberty to act with reference to the established
usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the
promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace
and good order." 43 That theme was repeated in Brown's dissent in
Scott v. Donald, a case involving a challenge to the right of South
Carolina to seize liquor while still in the possession of the railroad
that had transported it into the state. Brown wrote:
We cannot fail to recognize the growing sentiment in this
country in favor of some restrictions upon the sale of ardent
spirits, and whether such restrictions shall take the form of a
license tax upon dealers, a total prohibition of all manufacture
or sale whatever, or the assumption by the state government of
the power to supply all liquors to its inhabitants [as had been
done in44South Carolina] is a matter exclusively for the States to
decide .
Later in the same opinion he warned of the "manifest dangers to the
future of the country, which lurk in the inflexibility of the Federal
Constitution," and advised that45 ourts should avoid "vexatious
interference" with state actions.
In Holden v. Hardy, 46 Brown emphasized the need for flexibility so legislatures could respond to ever-changing conditions.
Holden challenged his conviction under a Utah statute that set an
eight-hour day as the maximum for miners. In his Court opinion
upholding the law, Brown wrote that "the law is, to a certain extent,
a progressive science." 47 He supported that assertion by pointing to
changes in procedures since the time of the Constitution. Although
the "cardinal principles of justice" were "immutable"
41. Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Minnesota, 186 U.S. 257, 263 (1902). See also
Public Clearing House .v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 509 (1904).
42. Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U.S. 51, 61 (1902).
43. 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).

44. 165 U.S. 58, 103 (1897). See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391, 393 (1898).
45. 165 U.S. at 106.

46. 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
47. Id. at 385-86.
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the methods by which justice is administered are subject to
constant fluctuation, and . . . the Constitution of the United

States, which is necessarily and to a large extent inflexible and
exceedingly difficult of amendment, should not be so construed
as to deprive the States of the power to so amend their laws as
to make them conform to the wishes of the citizens as they may
deem best for the public welfare without48 bringing them into
conflict with the supreme law of the land.
Alongside Brown's consistent modification of careful historical
argument by concern for flexibility and consequences, his opinions
overturning a statute reveal a curiously ad hoc approach. Brown,
unlike Holmes, Day, and Gray, balanced his deference with a concern that legislatures might abuse their power. Nowhere was that
more apparent than in his dissent in Florida Central & Peninsular

Railroad v. Reynolds. 49 Brown would have held unconstitutional a
Florida statute that authorized collecting back taxes for a three-year
period. To Brown the statute's flaw was its limited application: only
real estate owned by railroads was subject to the act. In a dissenting
opinion that cited no cases and offered no other explanation Brown
argued that " [t] his kind of discrimination
seems to be measurable
50
only by the rapacity of the legislature."
In Smith v. St. Louis & Southwestern Railway, 51 Brown joined

a similar concern about abuse of authority with emphasis on maintaining interstate commerce. Smith had sued the railway to compel it
to deliver cattle consigned to him. The railway refused because the
governor, based upon a finding of the livestock sanitary commission, had issued a proclamation ordering that no cattle be transported into Texas from Louisiana on account of the possibility of a
charbon or anthrax outbreak. Brown thought that the proclamation
went beyond the requirements of the case. As a result, it became "a
wholly unjustifiable interference with interstate commerce." 52 "The
statute thus construed," he warned, "puts a power into the hands
of
53
a sanitary commission which is liable to be greatly abused."
48. Id. at 387; cf. Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1900) (Fourteenth
Amendment not intended to limit power of people to amend laws to conform to
wishes of people or their needs).
49. 183 U.S. 471 (1902).
50. Id. at 483.
51. 181 U.S. 248 (1901).
52. Id. at 262.
53. Id. Another overly broad statute that Brown would have declared unconstitutional was involved in Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana St.
Bd. ofHealthl-186 U.S. 380 (1902). Acting under that statut.e, the-Bard had denied
permission to land for the passengers (from various countries including some citizens
Pf the United States) on a ship from Italy. Brown thought that the possibly permanent
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Brown voted to strike down other statutes that involved interstate commerce when he perceived an excessive use of power.
One such act was passed by the Illinois legislature to require all
5 4
trains to stop at county seats long enough to discharge passengers.
Returning to his concern for the consequences of a statute, Brown
reasoned that if a state could require stops at county seats they
could compel stops at every station, thereby destroying commerce:
"We are not obliged to shut our eyes to the fact that competition
among railways for through passenger traffic has become very spirited, and we think they have a right to demand that they shall not be
unnecessarily hampered in their efforts to obtain a share of such
traffic." 55
Brown's reliance upon historical scholarship links him to
Holmes and Gray. All three felt that precedent provided sufficient
justification for a decision; all three reflected their respect for state
government by citing a large number of state cases in their opinions.
At the opposite end of the spectrum was a group of Justices, Shiras,
Harlan, White, and Peckham, with markedly different styles. Instead of relying upon precedent they relied upon intuitive reason to
support their conclusions. Moreover, they exhibited a greater willingness to overturn statutes. For Shiras and especially Harlan, that
willingness was impelled by a desire to protect human rights. For
White and Peckham the results could be derived from reason alone.
That description is not meant to indicate a sharp distinction between
the two pairs, it only illustrates what seems to have been the primary
value choice for each Justice.
Justice Shiras cited more cases, on average, than did Harlan,
White, or Peckham. In his careful, considered use of precedent his
opinions are more like those of Justice Brown. And, like Brown,
Shiras belongs on the boundary between the groups. But Shiras'
other characteristics, his repeated statements that courts are not to
consider the wisdom of a statute and 5his
concern for human rights,
6
serve as a preview of Justice Harlan.
exclusion without regard to country of origin or condition of health was an unreasonable interference with foreign commerce.
54. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Illinois, 177 U.S. 514 (1900).
55. Id. at 522. In Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Sims, 191 U.S. 441 (1903), Brown wrote the
unanimous opinion which struck down a law that, if enforced, would have eliminated
an "important branch" of interstate commerce-catalogue sales by Sears. Id. at
446-47. For similar results, also in cases involving commercial transportation, see The
Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185 (1903); Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R. v. Mayes, 201 U.S. 321

(1906).
56. One unusual trait was Shiras' tendency to comment upon the regularity with
which certain issues came before the Court. He treated that repetition with ambivalence. In American Refrigerator Transit Company v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70 (1899), for
example, the court was faced with a challenge to the power of a state to tax a foreign
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The difference between the two extreme groups was evident in
Shiras' lengthy dissent in Brown v. Walker. 57 For the Court, Justice
Brown had written that Congress could compel testimony by granting immunity from prosecution for the testimony given. Not to conclude that Congress had that power, Justice Brown had reasoned,
would be to deny effect to the Interstate Commerce Act. Justice
Shiras was joined by Justices Field, Gray, and White in disagreeing
with that conclusion. Shiras' "natural impulse" was to rule that the
statute was plainly unconstitutional since it tampered with a right
that had been removed from the power of the legislature by the Fifth
Amendment.5 8 Even so, it was the duty of the Court, "as the final
expositor as well of the Constitution as of the acts of Congress, to \
dispassionately consider and determine" whether the statute was
valid.5 9 He decided that the statute was a patent violation of the
Constitution. Terming Brown's argument about the need for an effective Interstate Commerce Act a dangerous one, Shiras concluded
that if
experience has shown, or shall show, that one or more of the
provisions of the Constitution has become unsuited to affairs as
they now exist, and unduly fetters the courts in the enforcement
of useful laws, the remedy must be found in the right of the
nation to amend the fundamental law, and not in appeals to the
courts to substitute for a constitutional guaranty the60 doubtful
and uncertain provisions of an experimental statute.
Thus, for Shiras the words of the Constitution served as his
guide for deciding cases. As he repeatedly emphasized, however,
those words were not to be supplemented by the views of individual
judges. He reminded his fellow judges of that in Inuisville & Nash-

corporation's assests (railroad rolling stock). "The frequency with which the question
has arisen," Shiras wrote for the Court, "is evidence both of its importance and of its
difficulty," Id. at 74. But other cases, among them those involving assessments for
public improvements, had also been before the Court many times. Their frequent
appearance made lengthy consideration unnecessary. Itwas sufficient for the Court
"to collate our previous decisions and to apply the conclusions reached therein to the
present case." French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 328 (1901). See
also Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622, 624-25 (1903); Chadwick v. Kelley, 187
U.S. 540, 543 (1903): Chicago, B.&O. R.R. V. Nebraska ex rel. Omaha, 179 U.S. 57,
67 (1898); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 90 (1897).
57. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
58. Id. at 6-1I.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 627. In the same opinion he wrote that "no apology for the Constitution,
as it exists, is called for. The task of the courts is performed if the Constitution is
sustained in its entirety, in its letter and spirit." Id. at 628.
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ville Railroad v. Kentucky 61 when he wrote that it was "scarcely

necessary to say that courts do not sit in judgment on the wisdom of
legislative or constitutional enactments." 62 That opinion considered
the power of a state to set the rates for intrastate rail transportation.
In another case, involving the power of states to alter rights of
redemption after foreclosure sales, Shiras expressed a similar
thought in these words "We, of course, have nothing to do with the
fairness or the policy of such enactments as respect those who
choose to contract in view of t1hem." 63 In a third case he linked his
dependence upon the Constitution with his disavowal of any concern about the policies involved in the statute:
The validity of the statute and of the ordinance having been
passed upon and upheld by the courts of the State, it is not the
function of this court, apart from the provisions of the Federal
Constitution supposed to be involved, to declare state enactand may inments void, because they seem doubtful
64 in policy
flict hardships in particular instances.
The opinions expressed by Justice Shiras also represented the
value preferences that characterized Harlan's opinions. Both Justices found in the words of the Constitution support for the value
each placed on human rights; both warned against judges' injecting
their own beliefs into those words. But the similarities cannot hide
the unique nature of Harlan's position on the Court. One third of his
fifty-four written opinions were dissents; only thirteen of his thirtytwo majority opinions were unanimous (no other Justice had less
that half of his majority opinions be unanimous). Nevertheless, Harlan's rate of citation places him with White and Peckham as the
members of the Court who cited the fewest cases.
As did the other members of this group, Harlan repeatedly
warned against judges' dealing with the wisdom of a statute. His
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson65 contained this typical expression of
his view:
There is a dangerous tendency in these latter days to enlarge the
functions of the courts, by means of judicial interference with
the will of the people as expressed by the legislature. Our institutions have the distinguishing characteristics that the three
departments of government are coordinate and separate. Each
61. 183 U.S. 503 (1902).
62. Id. at 512. Cf. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285, 331 (1899)
(dissenting opinion) (reasonableness not for courts to consider).
63. Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118, 130 (1896).
64. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Nebraska ex rel. Omaha, 170 U.S. 57, 77 (1898).
65. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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must keep within the limits defined by the Constitution. And the
courts best discharge their duty by executing the will of the
lawmaking power, constitutionally expressed, leaving the results of the legislation66 to be dealt with by the people through

their representatives.
There was another "distinguishing characteristic" of the government that led Harlan to depart from that apparently stringent
standard and to vote to overturn statutes more often than any other
Justice. 67 He identified that other characteristic in Smyth v. Ames,S6

one of his majority opinions overturning a statute. In that case the
stockholders and bondholders of various railroads challenged the
constitutionality of a Nebraska statute that established a Board of
Transportation to regulate railroads and set maximum rates. Harlan
explained that the Court could not "shrink from its duty to determine" whether the statute infringed upon constitutional rights. That
duty, he contended, "distinguishes the American system from all
other systems of government. The perpetuity of our institutions and
the liberty which is enjoyed under them depend, in no small degree,

upon the power given the judiciary to declare null and void all legis69
lation that is clearly repugnant to the supreme law of the land."

Justice Holmes had been willing to share responsibility for preserving the liberties with the legislatures. Harlan was not so willing. For
him, the courts were the final protectors of liberties.7 0
66. Id. at 558. The same opinion also included this statement: Howeverapparent the
injustice of such legislation may be, we have only to consider whether it is consistent with
the Constitution of the United States." id. at 553. For a similar statement by Justice
Shiras, see note 60 supra. See also W.W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U.S. 452, 469
(1901); New York, N.H. & H. R.R. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628,632 (1897); Hennington
v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 303-04 (1896).
That principle had especial validity when the statute that was challenged was one
relating to taxation. As Harlan explained in King v. Mullins, "[t]he judiciary should
be very reluctant to interfere with the taxing systems of a State, and should never do
so unless that which the State attempts to do is in palpable violation of the constitutional rights of the owners of property." 171 U.S. 404, 436 (1898).
67. See footnote 7 supra, Harlan wrote twentyfive opinions to explain his votes to
overturn statutes. Unlike Justice Brown, whose opinions to overturn statutes evidenced an increased reliance upon precedent, Justice Harlan's opinions showed a
lower number of precedents cited to support his conclusion. Harlan wrote only four
majority opinions in which a statute was overturned. In those cases his rate of citation
was 1.16 cases per page. His rate for all opinions was 1.42
68. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
69. Id. at 527-28.
70. Shiras made a similar statement, see text at note 61 supra. The importance
Harlan placed on the courts as guardians of liberty may explain his concern for
protecting the judicial process from legislative interference. See, e.g., Atchison, T. &
S.F. R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 124 (1899) (dissenting opinion) ("If there is one
place under our system of government where all should be in a position to have equal
and exact justice done to them, it is a court of justice .... ").
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In resolving the tension between the respect due legislative
enactments and the duty of the courts to uphold the Constitution,
Justice Harlan called upon all the persuasive techniques used by
other members of the Court. He relied heavily upon historical evidence when it supported his position. In Hennington v. Georgia7
the challenged statute prohibited trains from running on Sunday. To
support his conclusion that the statute was valid, Harlan began by
commenting upon the history of similar laws: "From the earliest
period in the history of Georgia it has been the policy of that state, as
it was the policy of many of the original States, to prohibit all persons, under penalties, from using the Sabbath as a day for labor and
for pursuing their ordinary callings." 72 Likewise, in Fairbank v.
United States 73 Harlan criticized the majority for "departing from a
rule of constitutional construction by which this74 court has been.
guided since the foundation of the Government."
But, if the historical evidence appeared to be against him, he
was ready to disregard it, usually in favor of notions of human rights.
When the power of Congress to authorize justices of the peace to
arrest deserting seamen was challenged as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, the majority upheld the statute on the ground
that seamen were a longstanding exception to rules against slavery.75 Justice Harlan rejected that analysis because the value placed
on human life had changed. "It will not do," he wrote, "to say that
by 'immemorial usage' seamen could be held in condition of involuntary servitude, without having been convicted of a crime." The
Thirteenth Amendment already contained one exception, to add
another without amending the Constitution amounted to "judicial
legislation." Recalling his other rules concerning the implications of
overturning an act of a legislature, Harlan commented that it was
especially serious to depart from the 76clear meaning of a provision
when it related to the liberty of man.
Other than when he perceived a threat to human rights, Harlan
was also willing to intervene in cases involving assessment of property. He wrote the Court's opinion in Norwood v. Baker, 77 which

71. 163 U.S. 299 (1896).
72. Id.at 303.
73. 181 U.S. 283 (1901).
74. Id. at 313. Harlan expressed a similar opinion in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581
(1900). There he disagreed with the majority's view that proceeding by information and
an eight-man jury did not violate due process. Id. at 610-11. See also his concurring
opinion in Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 528-31 (1905).
75. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 286-87 (1897) (Brown J.).
76. Id. at 301-02.
77. 172 U.S. 269 (1898).
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held that a state could not assess property for an improvement without regard to the benefits received from the improvement. As the
Court began to modify that principle in later cases, Harlan regularly
dissented. He repeated that "[w] e live under a Constitution which is
the supreme law of the land. It enumerates the powers of government, and prescribes limitations and restrictions upon legislative
authority as to the property of citizens." 78 The courts offered the
only haven for protection against the excesses of legislatures. 79 But
in their role as protector, the judges were not dependent upon their
own views of what was constitutional. Rather, "the will of the
people as expressed in the fundamental law must be the will of
courts and legislatures." 0
Those two groups of cases marked the limits of Harlan's intervention. In other cases he adhered to his oft-repeated policy of
deferring to the legislature. As he said in a case involving a statute
setting the maximun workday for state employees:
it belongs to the State, as the guardian and trustee for its people,
and having control of its affairs, to prescribe the conditions
upon which it will permit public work to be done on its behalf,
or on behalf of its municipalities. No court has authority to
review its action in that respect. Regulations on this subject
suggest only considerations of public policy.
And with such
8
considerations the courts have no concern. 1
He would have reached the same conclusion for a statute that regulated the hours of private workers, including bakers.8 2
Harlan's cautions against excessive judicial intervention were
echoed by the third member of this group of Justices, Justice White.
White wrote two unanimous opinions for the Court dealing with the
power of a state to regulate the passing of property on death.83 In
each case he affirmed that the Court was concerned with neither the
wisdom nor the policy of a statute. 84 But, like Harlan, White fre-

78. French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 367 (1901).
79. Id. at 368,370. See also his dissents in the companion cases of Wight v. Davidson,
181 U.S. 371, 385 (1901) and Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U.S. 389, 392 (1901).
80. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 297 (1897) (dissenting opinion).
81. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903).
82. See Harlan's dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905).
83. Campbell v. California, 200 U.S. 87 (1906); Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198
U.S. 458 (1905).
84. 200 U.S. at 95; 198 U.S. at 469. See also Northern Cent. Ry. v. Maryland, 187 U.S.
258, 270 (1902).
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quently wrote to overturn legislative action.8 5 Unlike Harlan, however, White lacked a consistently articulated value preference that
would explain his actions. More than any other member of the
Court, White seemed to view the cases as exercises in pure logiche would seek an argument's inherent contradictions before he
would grapple with its legal implications. White at least offered an
explanation for his demand for intellectual rigor when he wrote that
"the departure from the pathway of principle
. . . is always
86
marked . . . by confusion and injustice."
White's fondness for philosophical analysis is well illustrated by
his dissent in Adams Express Company v. Ohio State Auditor.87 The
statute challenged in that case assessed taxes on a foreign corporation based upon its total value and not merely upon the value of the
property in the state. White thought that such taxation exceeded the
inherent powers of government (defined by its territorial limitations)
and violated the commerce clause. Couching his analysis of precedent in terms of semantics, he urged that the "great principles of
government rest upon solid foundations of truth and justice, and are
not to be set at naught and evaded by the mere confusion of
words." 88 He admitted that the entire value of a railroad or of a
telegraph company could be considered for taxation purposes. But
express companies owned movable property, unconnected by rail
or wire, in many states. To justify a tax on an express company by
reference to railroads "in reality declares that a mere metaphysical
or intellectual relation between property situated in one State and
property found in another creates as between such property a close
relation for the purpose of taxation." 8 9
This philosophical bent that characterized White's opinions
concealed no other value preference. Once White had demonstrated
an inherent flaw in an argument he was content to rely upon precedents to support his conclusion. 90 One instance of that process arose
in Knowlton v. Moore, a case involving a challenge to the power of
Congress to tax estates. 91 White first traced the history of estate

85. Thirteen of White's forty-three opinions held legislative action to be unconstitutional. When writing for the Court he increased his rate of citation from 1.4 cases
per page to 1.79, apparently evidencing concerns similar to those that motivated
Justice Brown.
86. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 243 (1897) (dissenting
opinion).
87. 165 U.S. 194 (1897).
88. Id. at 240.

89. Id. at 250.
90. See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana (No. 1), 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
91. 178 U.S.41 (1900).
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taxes to establish that they were imposed on the passage of property
and not on the property itself. Then he turned to the claim that the
power to impose taxes on estates was reserved to the states. One
way to refute that claim was to point to the exercise of the power
since 1797. He admitted the persuasive force of that evidence, but
put it aside to consider the reasoning behind the assertion of a lack of
congressional power. As he expressed the argument, the contention
was that Congress could not tax the exclusive power of the state to
regulate the passing of property at death. But that was fallacious
because the "thing forming the universal subject of taxation upon
which inheritance and legacy taxes rest is the transmission or receipt, and not the right existing to regulate." 92 "It cannot be
doubted," he concluded, "that the argument 93when reduced to its
essence demonstrates its own unsoundness."
White had a similar confidence in the ability of judges to recognize excesses in legislative action. That ability enabled them to defer
to the legislature on all but the most critical occasions. So, in
McCray v. United States, 94 after formulating a broad description of
Congress' power to tax, White concluded that in a case
where the abuse of the taxing power was so extreme as to be
beyond the principles which we have previously stated, and
where it was plain to the judicial mind that the power had been
called into play not for revenue but solely for the purpose of
destroying rights which could not be rightfully destroyed consistently with the principles of freedom and justice upon which
the Constitution rests, that it would be the duty of the courts to
say that such an arbitrary act was not merely an abuse of a
delegated 95power, but was the exercise of an authority not
conferred.
An abiding faith in the ability of the "judicial mind" to reach the
right result was the link between Justice Peckham and Justice White.
With the lowest rate of citing cases, Peckham's style more nearly
approached that of an essayist than any other Justice. Admittedly,
his opinion in United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Com-

pany contained the formularistic admonition that courts should not
strike down a state law unless it was "palpably without reasonable
foundation." 96 But other than that reference in his first term on the
92. Id.at 59.
93. Id. at 60. Cf. Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484, 489 (1900) ("fallacy which is
involved"); Baltzer v. North Carolina, 161 U.S. 240, 245, 246 (1896) ("reasoning in a
vicious circle" and "fallacy contained in the argument").

94. 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
95. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
96. 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896).
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Court, Peckham did not mention the phrase again. 9 Instead he relied
upon his own reason to reveal the "right" answer.
Gettysburg Electric was a case brought to dispute the power of
the federal government to buy, land for Gettysburg National Park.
For a unanimous Court, Peckham upheld a broad grant of power to
the government to condemn land. One statement in his opinion embodied both elements of his style: to define "public purposes" he
referred to Judge Dillon's treatise on municipal corporations in
which "many authorities were cited" to support the rule, "and,
indeed, the rule commends itself as a rational and proper one." 98 It
was enough that the cases were numerous, Peckham did not have to
list them. Moreover, the rule was reasonable, it did not require the
support of precedent. Characteristically, the precedents which he
did mention were used to establish general principles governing the
case. In this opinion he listed three earlier cases to support the
proposition that Congress had authority to condemn land
"whenever it is necessary or appropriate to use the land in the
execution of any of the powers; granted to it by the Constitution." 99
Having established the principle, he referred to but one other case.
What followed was an essay on patriotism. For example, he wrote:
Any act of Congress which plainly and directly tends to enhance
the respect and love of the citizen for the institutions of his
country and to quicken and strengthen his motives to defend
them, and which is germane to and intimately connected with
and appropriate to the exercise of some one or all of the powers
granted by Congress must be valid.100
The same principle-essay technique was used in a later opinion,
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v. Smith. 0 1 That case

involved a challenge to a Michigan statute requiring all railroads to
sell "one-thousand-mile-tickets," which were valid for two years.
By a vote of six to three the Court held that the statute violated both
the due process and the equal protection clauses. In the first four
pages of his majority opinion Peckham cited seventeen cases to
establish the boundaries of the conflict between the police power
and due process. In the nine-page essay that followed, he explained
97. The only modest exception to the statement in text is in Skaneateles Water
Works Co. v. Skaneateles, 184 U.S. 3:54 (1902). That case arose after a city failed to
renew its contract with the water company after the first five years of operation. In an
innuendo-filled statement, Peckham disclaimed any interest in what "the village
ought to do in the moral aspect of the case." Id. at 367.

98. 160 U.S. at 680.
99. Id. at 679.
100. Id. at 681.

101. 173 U.S. 684 (1899).
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that once a state established a maximum rate for passengers or
freight it could not "then proceed to make exceptions to it in favor of

such persons or classes as in the legislative judgment or caprice may
seem proper." 102 To do so would be an interference with management and a discrimination in favor of the wholesale buyer. 0 3 In
addition, he thought that there had been a denial of due process
because the railroad had been compelled to sell its property (service)
at a rate below the permitted maximum. Peckham repeated those
contentions before reaching his final and most revealing conclusion:
"we find it neither necessary nor appropriate" for the legislature to
enact the statute. 104 For Peckham a majority of the Court was the
final arbiter of the statute's reasonableness. If he recognized any
values which competed with that view he exhibited no compulsion
to discuss them.
A final illustrative case, also involving state regulation of rail-

roads, was Central of Georgia Railway v. Murphey.'05 Under Geor-

gia law the first of a succession of common carriers was obligated to
determine the cause and party responsible for damage to goods in
transit. If that carrier failed to do so within a specified time it was
made liable for the entire damage. According to the railway, to
enforce the statute for damage done on the out-of-state portion of an
interstate shipment would violate the commerce clause. The court
unanimously agreed. Peckham was convinced that the statute was
unconstitutional. Without supporting citations, he wrote, "It is idle
to attempt to comment upon the various cases decided by this court
relating to this clause of the Federal Constitution. We are familiar
with them, and we are certain that our decision in this case does not
run counter to the principles decided in any of those cases." 106
Peckham's principle-essay style was at its purest in Allgeyer v.
Louisiana10 7 and Lochner v. New York.10 8 Allgeyer arose from a
Louisiana statute regulating insurance companies. A company that
did "any act" in the state to effect insurance was subject to a fine if
it had not first complied with state law. In this instance a fine was
imposed for posting a letter to notify the insurance company of a
cotton shipment. That notification was required under an insurance

102. Id. at 695.
103. Id. at 691.
104. Id. at 696 (emphasis added).
105. 196 U.S. 194 (1905). See also Wisconsin, M. & P. R.R. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S.
287 (1900).
106. 196 U.S. at 206.
107. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
108. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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contract previously made outside of Louisiana; the insurance company had no agents in the state. Peckham first distinguished this case
from those in which the insurance contract was concluded within a
state-in those cases the state clearly had the power to regulate the
contract. He returned to that .jurisdictional argument at the end of
his opinion when he referred to other decisions that would deny
Louisiana's power in this instance. Between those jurisdictional
statements he authored a now well-known essay on liberty. Only
two cases were mentioned, both to show that general definitions had
been given to "liberty." In part, he wrote:
The liberty mentioned in that amendment [the Fourteenth]
means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere
physical restraint of his person ....

but the term is deemed to

embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all
his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary
and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion on
the purposes above mentioned. 10 9
The essay in Lochner was even longer. A New York statute
limited the hours a bakery employee could work in a week. After
being convicted for allowing an employee to work more hours,
Lochner challenged the statute as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Peckham's opinion began by defining the statute as
"an absolute prohibition upon the employer, permitting, under any
circumstances, more than ten hours work [a day] to be done in his
establishment." 110 As he had done in Lake Shore, he utilized prece-

dents to portray the tension between liberty and the police power.
Then, after he had defined the topic of his essay (whether liberty
limited this particular exercise of the police power), he wrote without citation. Even though he admitted that there could be close
decisions,"' for him there were but two choices:
Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police
power of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and
arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor
or necessary for the supwhich may seem to him appropriate
port of himself and his family.' 12
109. 165 U.S. at 589.
110.
111.
Justice
112.

198 U.S. at 52.
As an example he gave Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898), an opinion by
Brown from which Peckham had dissented.
198 U.S. at 56.
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His response to the starkly defined question was unequivocal:
"There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of
person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of
labor, in the occupation of a baker." 113
To label Peckham an essayist is not to assert that every opinion
had the same format. Rather it is to characterize that which was
typical in his opinions. He was most assertive when the police power
was used to regulate business. Then he was prepared to instruct a
legislature about reason. When the police power was used to apprehend more traditional criminals, however, his style was noticeably different. With only three cases involving criminal procedure,
the numerical analysis is not of great significance. Nevertheless, the
change in style is indicated by his average rate of citing cases (2.2
per page compared with 1.3 overall). He abandoned the essay format
and relied instead upon precedents to support his conclusions.
Maxwell v. Dow" 4 involved the claim that Utah's prosecution
by information and trial before an eight-man jury violated the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Reliance upon precedents in responding to that claim changed none of
Peckham's certainty. But, instead of emphasizing reason, he pointed
to precedent to justify his conclusion:
We think the various questions raised . . . have in sub-

stance, though not all in terms, been decided by this court in the
cases to which attention will be called. The principles which
have been announced in those cases clearly prove the validity
of the clauses in the constitution of Utah which are herein attacked ....

It will, therefore, be necessary in this case to do but

little else than call attention to the former decisions of this
court, and thereby furnish 5 a conclusive answer to the contentions of plaintiff in error.1
The remainder of the opinion was a mixture of Peckham and precedent,
of assertion and authority. Similar usage of precedent occurred in the
other two criminal procedure cases, West v. Louisiana116 (confrontation of witnesses) and Jack v. Kansas"7 (self-incrimination and immunity).

113. Id. at 57. That statement should be compared with his assertion about
oleomargarine: "In brief, every intelligent man knows its general nature, and that it is
prepared as an article of food, and is dealt in as such to a large extent throughout this
country and in Europe." Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 10 (1898).
114. 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
115. Id.at 583.
116. 194 U.S. 258 (1904).
117. 199 U.S. 372 (1905).
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Possibly more surprising than his frequent use of precedents was
his willingness to defer to the state legislatures. His deference was
explicit in Maxwell when he wrote that "we are of opinion that they
[ the people] are much betterjudges of what they ought to have in these
respects than any one else can be." 11 Elsewhere in the same opinion
he explained, "It is a case of self-protection, and the people can be
trusted to look out and care for themselves." "9He seemed to believe
that because the criminal law affected everyone, the legislature could
be trusted to act reasonably. In Peckham's mind, however, self-interest
was apparently not a reliable restraint to the regulation of business.
Peckham was confident of the rightness of his results. His confidence arose from believing that reason was on his side; reason, not
precedent, was his favorite ally. When he did utilize precedents he
relied almost exclusively upon Supreme Court opinions to the near
exclusion of lower federal or state courts and to the total exclusion of
English or other foreign cases.
The remaining Justices, Brewer, McKenna, and Fuller, cannot be
as easily characterized as those grouped with the two extremes of
Holmes and Peckham. Instead, ranged between the two groups, these
three Justices share certain of the characteristics of each group while
lacking sufficient identity to be classed with either group. Like those
grouped with Justice Holmes, Brewer frequently relied upon numerous citations to support his conclusions. Unlike that group, however,
Brewer articulated another value-the principle of natural justice.
Along with the additional value came a greater insistence that the Court
was concerned with the power of legislatures to act and not with the
wisdom of their actions. That insistence linked Brewer with the other
group of Justices.
Brewer first revealed his concern with values other than precedent in Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway v. Ellis. 20 Under the Texas

statute involved in that case, attorneys' fees of not more than ten
dollars were added to any successful suit against a railroad if the
railroad did not pay within thirty days after a claim was filed and the
claim was for less than fifty dollars. Writing for a six-man majority,
Brewer explained that the statute was a clear denial of equal protection

118. 176 U.S. at 604. In three cases involving irrigation districts Peckham exhibited
a similar deference to the legislature. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S.
112, 161 (1896) (without irrigation millions of acres of land must be left uncultivated
"an effectual obstacle ... in the way of the advance of a large portion of the State in
material wealth and prosperity"); Stanislaus County- v.- San-Joaquin & King's R.
Canal & Irrigation Co., 192 U.S. 201 (1904); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
119. 176 U.S. at 605.
120. 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
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because only railroads were subject to the penalty.' To supplement
the many cases illustrating the enforcement of equal protection,
Brewer called upon the "spirit of the Declaration of Independence." 122
That supplement wasjustified because "[ n] o duty rests more imperatively upon the courts than the enforcement of the constitutional
provisions intended to secure that equality of rights which is the
foundation of free government." 123
In Adams Express Company v. Ohio State Auditor,'12 4 a similar
value intermingled with Brewer's realization that changing conditions required changing laws. Brewer undertook to explain the denial of a rehearing for a company to challenge a tax on its intangible
property. "In the complex civilization of to-day," he wrote, "a large
portion of the wealth of a community consists in intangible property." 125 "To ignore this intangible property," he continued, "or to
hold that it is not subject to taxation at its accepted value, is to
eliminate from the reach of the taxing power a large portion of the
wealth of the country." 126 It would thus be a "mockery of substantial justice" "for a corporation, whose property is worth to its
stockholders for the purposes of income and sale $16,800,000, to be
adjudged liable for taxation upon only one fourth of that amount." 127
Brewer's allusion to "substantial justice" was supplemented by a
concluding passage that echoed opinions by Holmes and Brown:
In conclusion, let us say that this is entirely a practical age;
that courts must recognize things as they are and as possessing
a value which is accorded to them in the markets of the world,
and that no fine-spun theories about situs should interfere to
enable these large corporations, whose business is carried on
through many States, to escape from bearing in each State such

121. id. at 153, 157, 158.
122. Id. at 160. See also his dissent in Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank. 170
U.S. 283, 301 (1898).
123. 165 U.S. at 160.
124. 166 U.S. 185 (1897) (on rehearing of case reported at 165 U.S. 194 (1897); see text
accompanying notes 87-89 supra).
125. Id. at 218.
126. Id. at 219.
127. Id. at 222.
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burden of taxation as a fair distribution of the
12 8 actual value of
their property among those States requires.
That Brewer was at times dissatisfied with his mixture of values
may be inferred from his opinion for the Court in Atchison, Topeka

& Santa Fe Railroad v. Matthews.12 9 Like the Texas statute in Ellis,

the statute in this case imposed attorneys' fees on railroads that did
not settle a claim before trial. Brewer distinguished the two statutes:
Ellis had involved debts, this statute involved settlement of claims
for damage caused by fire. The distinction was vital because there
was no difference between a railroad qua debtor and all other debtors though there was a difference between a railroad qua causer of
fires and all other corporations. 130 Even though vital, the distinction,
which had evaded four members of the Court, was not an easy one
to make. The principles that governed the distinction were "not
difficult of comprehension or statement, yet their application often
becomes very troublesome, especially when a case is near the dividing line. It is easy to distinguish between the full light of day and the
darkness of midnight, but often very difficult to determine whether a
given moment in the twilight hour is before or after that in which the
light predominates over the darkness." 131 Thus, it was not surprising that in doubtful cases "the justices have often divided in opinion.
To some the statute presented seemed a mere arbitrary selection; to
others it appeared that there was some reasonable basis of classification." 132 After making that distinction, Brewer interposed his disclaimer of any interest in the wisdom of the classification. "it cannot
be too often said," he reiterated, "that forms are matters of legislative consideration;
results and power only are to be considered by
133
the courts."
128. Id. at 225. The additional value (and its apparent corollary, the disavowal of
any interest in policy) was apparent throughout Brewer's opinions. In Hawker v. New
York it was mixed with a respect for a legislative judgment about qualifications to
practice medicine. The statute made it a misdemeanor for anyone to practice medi-

cine after being convicted of a felony. Brewer wrote that it was "not the province of
the courts to say that other tests would be more satisfactory, or that the naming of
other qualifications would be more conducive to the desired result. These are questions for the legislature to determine." 170 U.S. 189, 195 (1898).
129. 174 U.S. 96 (1899).
130. See id. at 102.
131. Id.at 103.
132. Id.at 105.
133. Id. at 103. Even though uncomfortable with the mixture of values, Brewer
continued to adhere to them. In Lindsay and Phelps Company v. Mullen he wrote an
opinion for the Court to explain the validity of a statute that granted a lien on logs to
cover the cost of scaling and surveying those logs. According to Brewer, that was a
sensible provision because any other result "would strike a serious blow at the
legislation of many of the Northwestern States and an immense volume of business
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After the turn of the century Brewer acknowledged that he was
troubled by the demands made by changing conditions and the increasing difficulty of drawing lines as he tried to preserve interstate
commerce, allowing flexibility, and be true to the demands of justice. In Austin v. Tennessee' 34 he thought that the majority had
failed to protect interstate commerce when it decided that
Tennessee could prohibit the importation of cigarettes in packages
of ten. Unlike his decision in Matthews, he admitted to no difficulty
in drawing lines: either the state had the power to prohibit importation or it did not. To Brewer the answer was plain: the state did not
have the power.1 35 Moreover, in a case such as this in which his
opinion had no appearance of vacillation, he expressed his regret
"that the decision of a great constitutional question like that here
judges as to the
presented turns on the shifting opinions
36 of individual
peculiar facts of a particular case." 1
Among the greatest demands made by changing conditions were
those for increased revenue. Brewer recognized the importance of
those demands, but he appealed to higher values when he felt com37
pelled to overturn a taxing statute. In Fairbankv. United States'
he wrote for the Court an opinion that declared unconstitutional a
ten-cent stamp tax on all bills of lading for export outside of North
America. To explain his decision he referred to the "judicial duty of
upholding the provisions of the Constitution as against any legislation conflicting therewith." 138 That duty required that constitutional
grants of power as well as constitutional limitations "be enforced
according to their letter and spirit." 139 The fact that other taxes
would also fall if this one did was of little consequence when compared with the Court's duty to adhere to the "true construction of
the constitutional limitation." 140
that has been carried on under the authority of that legislation." 176 U.S. 126, 138
(1900). To that concern for the consequences of the decision he added that it was "not
for the courts to inquire whether any other provision would have been wiser. The
only question for us to consider is whether that which has been made was within the
power of the legislature." Id. at 146. For other statements of this view, see Travellers'
Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 185 U.S. 364, 371 (1902); Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 619
(1902); Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 110 (1901): L'Hote v.
New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 597 (1900); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Illinois, 177
U.S. 514, 523 (1900) (concurring opinion).
134. 179 U.S. 343 (1900).
135. Id.at 381, 383.
136. Id.at 383.
137. 181 U.S. 283 (1901).
138. Id. at 286.
139. Id. at 300.
140. Id. at 305. This statement should be compared with Justice Shiras' statement
at note 60 supra.
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Other than that decision, however, Brewer was sympathetic to
the need for taxation. He characterized taxes not as debts, but as the
highest obligation, "a contribution to the support of government." 141 A tax could be increased even after it had been collected
because "so long as there exists public needs just so long exists the
liability of the individual to contribute thereto." 142 By 1903 Brewer
had seen enough taxation cases to enable him to write:
Few questions are more important or have been more embarrassing than those arising from the efforts of a State or its
municipalities to increase their revenues by exactions from corporations engaged in carrying on interstate commerce. There
have been many cases, in whose decision some propositions
have been 14adjudicated
so often as to be no longer open to
3
discussion.
From the statement it would appear that Brewer departed from his
reliance on precedent only when the issues had not been settled. For
those unsettled cases he relied upon some other value; but once the
process of decisionmaking had run its course he was content to
return to reliance upon precedent to support his conclusions.
Nevertheless, in 1904 Brewer wrote, "To hold the even balance
between the Nation and the States in the exercise of their respective
powers and rights, always difficult, is becoming more so through the
growing complexity of social life, and business conditions." 144
The most severe challenge to those views arose in South
Carolina v. United States.1 4 5 South Carolina, whose dispensary law
had often been before the Court, challenged the power of the United
'States to impose a iicense tax on state-owned liquor stores. Brewer
began his opinion upholding the law by recalling that "[t]o preserve
the even balance between these two governments and hold each in
its separate sphere is the peculiar duty of all courts, preeminently of
this-a duty oftentimes of great delicacy and difficulty." 146 To respond to that duty required the Court to discover what the Constitution meant in 1789, for "[t]hat which it meant when adopted it means
now." 147 After a lengthy discussion of the nature of the divided
sovereignties he concluded that if South Carolina could exempt this
141. Florida Cent. & P. R.R. v. Reynolds, 183 U.S. 471, 481 (1902).
142. Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 619 (1902).
143. Atlantic & Pacific Tel Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160, 162 (1903). See also
Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245, 292 (1906).
144. New York ex rel. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Knight, 192 U.S. 21, 26 (1904). See
also In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 505 (1905).

145. 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
146. Id.at 448.

147. Id.
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business from taxation it could exempt all business from federal
taxation, thereby crippling the federal government.1 41 So he concluded with a compromise: to preserve the independence of the
states, they could remain free of taxation in the exercise of "strictly
business,
governmental" powers, but once they undertook 1 other
49
they were subject to the power of federal taxation.
The two Justices, who with Brewer formed the bridge between
the two groups, showed none of the internal struggle that had marked
Brewer's attempts to reconcile his mixture of values. Neither did
their opinions reveal any overriding value preference. Thus, as the
Justices who occupied the center of the continuum (McKenna cited
2.23 cases per page; Fuller cited 1.88; the Court's average was 1.91),
McKenna and Fuller are appropriately neutral. Their opinions lack
the dicta required to identify their judicial philosophies.
The only recurring theme in Justice McKenna's twenty-six
opinions was the impossibility of drawing exact lines for the purpose
of classification. As he wrote in Orient Insurance Company v.
Daggs' 150 "Classification for such purposes is not invalid because

not depending on scientific or marked differences in things or persons or in their relations. It suffices if it is practical, and is not
reviewable unless palpably arbitrary." 151 In addition, he included
the mandatory refrain disclaiming any interest in the policy of
statutes. 152

Because of the paucity of evidence it is difficult to attribute
McKenna's approach to a particular set of values. One bit of evidence does indicate that he may have been bored with the repeated
cases brought under the equal protection clause. In response to one
of those cases he wrote:
The answer to that charge depends upon the power of the
State to classify objects of legislation; necessarily a broad
power, and one which this court has so many times decided
exists, and so many times has defined and illustrated the limits
upon it of the provision of the Constitution of the United States
invoked by plaintiff in error, that farther definition would seem
impossible, and any new instance of its application not without
exact or analogous example in some decided case.' 53
148. Id. at 455
149. Id.at 461.
150. 172 U.S. 557 (1899).
151. Id. at 562. See also Magoun Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 296,
298 (1898).
152. See, e.g., Citizens' Bank v. Parker, 192 U.S. 73, 80-81 (1904); Magoun v. Illinois
Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 293 (1898).
153. Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114, 119 (1900).
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In one case he did engage in extensive discussion of the power of
states to classify, 154 but in a later case he explained that "the somewhat elementary and lengthy discussion in the opinion was induced
by the grounds upon which, and the ability with which, the statute

was attacked."

155

Chief Justice Fuller's decisions were equally nondescript. He
seemed content to permit others to speak for him since most of his
decisions consisted of quotations from other opinions. On occasion
he did step from behind the mask provided by others and suggest
that a particular outcome was better because of its consequences.
For example, in Henderson Bridge Company v. Kentucky,' 5 6 he
wrote an opinion for the Court upholding Kentucky's right to tax the
franchise of the bridge company which had erected a bridge across
the Ohio River into Indiana. The company contended that various
acts of Congress had insulated it from state taxation. Fuller concluded that an act regulating the height of bridges had not granted a
franchise, and that an act defining post roads had not taken the
company out of the state's taxation power. "The contrary view,"
Fuller explained, "would withdraw from the taxing power of the
States nearly all the railroads and stage routes throughout the country." ,.1 The only other significant departure from his normal format
occurred in his dissent for four members of the Court in the Lottery
Cases. 15 The dissenters disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that lottery tickets were items of commerce and could therefore be
regulated by Congress. To the dissenters the distinction was more
than formal; to break down the difference between what was and
what was not commerce would "take from the States all jurisdiction
over the subject so far as interstate communication is concerned. It
is a long step in the direction of wiping out all traces of state lines,
and the creation of a centralized Government." 151

154. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898). In that
decision he cited 3.5 cases per page, compared with his average of 2.2.
155. Billings v. Illinois, 188 U.S. 97, 101 (1903).

156. 166 U.S. 150 (1897).
157. Id.at 154.
158. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
159. Id. at 371. One othercase involving the powerofstates to regulate commerce also
provoked a longer than usual discussion by Fuller. See Patapsco Guano Co. v. North
Carolina Bd. of Agriculture, 171 U.S. 345 (1898). Fuller did not, however, adhere to a
dominant value of state regulation of commerce. In Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343
(1900), he voted with the dissenters to overturn the statute. He also voted to overturn a
Missouri law that created procedures for inspecting beer imported from other states.
Since there was no inspection the statute could not bejustified underthe police powers of
the state. See Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U.S. 17 (1905).
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The assumption of this article is that judges write opinions to do
something more than announce a result. Through opinions judges
attempt to explain a result in a way that will convince an audience
that they too would have reached the same result. Presumably,
judges resort to those arguments which they feel will be most persuasive. Thus, because a particular result can often be explained in a
number of ways, the choice of argument reflects both what the
judge considers to be important and what the judge perceives to be
acceptable to the audience. When the choices are made in a case
involving a conflict with another branch or level of government, the
choices also reveal much about a judge's perception of the proper
role of the judiciary.
The Justices on the Fuller Court had different perceptions of
their role and of the arguments that would persuade an audience.
Those differences demonstrate that the oft-used categories of formalism and instrumentalism are both inconsistent and inadequate to
describe the Justices on the Court. They are inconsistent because
they permit Justice Holmes to be classified as both a formalist,
because he cited many cases, and as an instrumentalist, because he
seldom voted to overturn a statute. Likewise, Justice Peckham was
a formalist, because he frequently voted to overturn statutes, and an
instrumentalist, because he cited few cases. The categories are inadequate because they do not allow for variations among the
Justices.
This article has proposed a different measurement to remedy
the inconsistencies and inadequacies of the formalism-instrumentalism dichotomy. Instead of inconsistent labeling, the proposed
measurement shows that Justices Holmes and Peckham represented
the two opposite styles on the Fuller Court. The other Justices can
be arranged between the two extremes. In addition to its sensitivity
to differences among the Justices, the measurement affords objective data which are adequate to establish the existence of the differences. The methodology explained in this article therefore offers a
more complete and more accurate description of styles of judicial
decisionmaking.

